Where is mons graupius

They had realized at last that common action was needed to meet the common danger, and had sent round embassies and drawn up treaties to rally the full force of all their states. To subdue the recalcitrant Caledonian tribes to the north, Agricola marched beyond the isthmus formed by the Firth of Clyde and the Firth of Forth into the highlands of Scotland, establishing a series of temporary camps along the way.

Meanwhile, the fleet was sent ahead to raid the coast and provide supplies. Probably by the late summer or early fall of AD 83, in the seventh and final campaign season of his governorship, Agricola and Calgacus, leader of the Caledonii and a confederation of northern clans, confronted one another at a place named Mons Graupius.

Roman auxiliary troops numbered eight thousand infantry and four or five thousand cavalry, all chosen from loyal tribes and led on foot by Agricola himself. After an exchange of missiles, the auxiliaries Batavi and Tungri from the Continent closed in hand-to-hand combat, their short thrusting swords proving more effective than the long unwieldy swords and small shields of the Britons. At the same time, the cavalry dispersed the British chariots and themselves engaged the enemy on the sloping ground, the fray made even more chaotic by terrified riderless horses and unmanned chariots.

As the Britons moved down the hill, Agricola threw in the reserve cavalry, which broke through the line and attacked them from the rear.

Routed, the natives fled into the nearby forest, the remainder saved by the coming nightfall. Ten thousand Britons died; on the Roman side, says Tacitus, three-hundred sixty fell figures that may be rhetorical, invented, or estimated. By dawn, there was only the silence of desolation and the smoke of huts burning in the distance, set fire by the Britons themselves.

Twenty thousand men retreated that night and, in spite of Tacitus' statement that the island had been conquered, the highlands still were relatively free beyond the Clyde-Forth isthmus.

The fleet was commanded to continue north around Britain, reconnoitering the coast, while the army retired south. Early the next year, Agricola was recalled to Rome by a resentful Domitian who, jealous of his success, would deny him any further imperial appointments.

In AD 85, there were barbarian attacks from Dacia in the east, and Domitian eventually was obliged to withdraw what military presence had remained behind in northern Britain. The fort at Inchtuthil, part of a series of garrisons that closed off the highlands, was dismantled not long after it had been completed and, with it, any plans to conquer the land.

Tacitus' description is the only literary evidence for the Battle of Mons Graupius , the location of which is not certain. Since Calgacus sought the confrontation, it also is presumed to have been on a route likely followed by the Romans on their march and near enough the coast for Agricola to maintain contact with his fleet. Several locations meet these requirements. One of the first to be put forward was Raedykes, a large camp situated where the Grampian foothills come closest to the sea and form a narrow corridor.

Here, it has been argued, is a strategic site where the Romans would have to be confronted if they were not to advance farther north. But, although large enough to contain Agricola's men, Raedykes may be Severan in origin and seems too far south to be reconciled with Agricola's belief that he had reached the northern-most part of the island, indeed, that he was at "the furthest point of Britain" XXXIII.

The heights, too, are not prominent enough to give the impression of serried ranks on its slopes, as Tacitus recounted, nor is there necessarily sufficient moorland for the cavalry to maneuver. The discovery of Durno, a marching camp near the mount at Bennachie, seems a more probable setting.

The terrain satisfies Tacitus' description of the battle. There is room to have extended the Roman line and still allow for the movement of cavalry, and the slope opposite is steep enough to provide a defensive position and give the impression of tiered troops.

The highlands to the west also offer a refuge for the defeated Caledonians. This stratagem had been devised centuries earlier to deal with war elephants but whether the Romans needed to use it here is uncertain.

For the Britons, chariots were used as an early form of dragoon, i. The chariot driver would approach the enemy and his warrior would disembark, fight a short action and then withdraw quickly by re-boarding the chariot.

It seems unlikely then that chariots sought to penetrate the Roman lines. At Mons Graupius Tacitus refers to a missile exchange and it seems likely these were delivered as part of the chariot action. The Roman forces, headed by the auxiliaries, now advanced upon the massed Caledonian infantry.

As they advanced they compressed the space in which the chariots could manoeuvre until they were pushed into the Caledonian infantry. Now static both charioteers and the Caledonian infantry started to suffer heavy casualties as the well armed - and heavily armoured - auxiliary infantry pushed forward.

The Romans started to gain ground hacking their way onto the lower slopes of Bennachie. It is possible Calgacus was killed in this part of the fighting. These troops now descended the hill and attempted to outflank the Roman lines. In response Agricola deployed his four regiments of auxiliary cavalry which he had kept in reserve. These experienced soldiers quickly routed the Caledonian reinforcements.

The auxiliary cavalry now turned on the flanks of the main body of Caledonians resulting in a collapse of order. Each of the tribes now tried to save itself resulting in a fragmentation of the whole Caledonian line. The Romans used their cavalry to ruthlessly pursue those who fled with the slaughter only coming to a halt at dusk. The battle was an overwhelming tactical victory for the Romans whose causalities, according to Tacitus, numbered a mere Given the contemporary official administrative records that would have verified this figure, this can be presumed an accurate account.

He also recorded 10, Britons killed which is perhaps more suspicious - yet even if half the figure was true it was nevertheless a stunning victory for the Romans. However, given the lateness of the season, Agricola had little choice but to withdraw his forces to their winter quarters which meant the bulk of the battle group leaving the operating area.

Agricola did however send the Classis Britannica the British Roman Navy - now relieved of the duty of providing logistical support to the main field army - to sail around the north of Britain. This undoubtedly ensured the message of the Caledonian defeat was carried far and wide - including Caithness, Orkney, Shetland and the isolated west Highland coast. Roman consolidation in the north resumed in AD 84 although, by this time, Agricola had been recalled to Rome.

With the immediate threat of a large scale Caledonian uprising having been neutralised by Mons Graupius, the Romans would doubtless have expected the defeated Caledonians to shift tactics to guerrilla strikes from the comparative safety of the Highland massif.

As with previous insurgencies in northern England, the Romans started construction of a militarised frontier aiming to encircle this vast geographical area and contain the threat. Despite this flurry of military activity following Mons Graupius, Roman occupation of northern Scotland ended a few years later. Scotland was left to the Caledonians but the details of the battle were immortalised in AD 98 when Tacitus published his biography on his father-in-law - De vita Iulii Agricolae.

A variety of different locations have been mooted as the site of the Battle of Mons Graupius. In a large Roman marching camp near Durno was identified just to the north of the mountain range of Bennachie. It has subsequently become the favoured location for the battle. The Marching Camp was unusually large - certainly big enough for Agricola's force but could also have housed the facilities required for an extended stay including medical services and workshops.

The marching camp at Durno near Bennachie is out of position for an army simply moving north indicating it was built for a special purpose. Knock Hill is distinctively shaped mound overlooking the Pass of Grange and is one of the more northerly sites mooted for the battle.

The only known Marching Camps nearby are at Auchinhove and Muiryfold but both are too small for a force of nearly 20, men and are also some way from the likely battlefield. Raedykes is situated at the southern end of the Grampian foothills and is sited near Stonehaven. A large Marching Camp is in the vicinity although this might date from the second century AD. It is not a notable landmark that would be identifiable to a wide variety of tribes who were unfamiliar with the area.

It is too close to the sea to chime with the comments by Tacitus that the Romans would be in severe trouble if they lost the battle as evacuation by sea via the Classis Britannica could have been achieved at nearby Stonehaven. Roman marching camps were used by the army as a means of penetrating deep into hostile territory. Roman tactical thinking assumed that any enemy could be defeated in the field by the superior training and equipment of the Legionaries but, like any regular army, they were vulnerable to unconventional attack particularly at night.

The defence to this threat was the marching camp - a makeshift fortification that could be dug by the soldiers in a few hours at the end of a day's march. The marching camp was defended by a ditch, perhaps only 1 metre deep and 2 metres wide, which provided spoil for a rampart.

This was then topped with stakes - the Legionary marching equipment included two per soldier - which were lashed together to form caltrops. The overall camp would be a configured into a 'playing card' shape although, unlike their forts, this was regularly modified to suit the local terrain.

Within the enclosure the same layout of tents would be used each time enabling every soldier to know where they were accommodated and, more importantly, where their station was in the event of attack. A significant gap between ramparts and the tents enabled a mustering area and ensured the accommodation was out of range of any projectiles thrown over the ramparts.

There were no gateways but entrances to the camp were protected by an additional earthwork. The aim of the marching camp was not a fortress impenetrable to attack - but rather one that would slow an enemy down sufficiently for the Romans to form up in battle order and defeat them.

Using such techniques the Romans could advance their armies into enemy territory. UK Map. Prelude Bennachie has a distinctive shape with no less than four distinctive summits and in AD 83 also hosted a substantial hillfort, Mither Tap. Total: 30, Including cavalry and chariots. Battle The site of the battle of Mons Graupius is yet to be established beyond doubt.

Aftermath The battle was an overwhelming tactical victory for the Romans whose causalities, according to Tacitus, numbered a mere In favour: 1. Bennachie is a notable and distinctive landmark. Fits with Tacitus's description. Against: 1. No archaeological evidence yet found on the suspected battlefield. It is a notable landmark. Against : 1.